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Roblette
Security

What is protected, what is paused, and what we cannot do.

A plain account of where Roblette stands today. Where something is planned rather than done, it says so.

Not yet auditedContracts in developmentMultisig planned
Smart contracts

A small, separable contract set.

The protocol is split into single-purpose contracts: treasury, chips, tables, rewards, randomness, risk, access and pause. Each one is small enough to read in a sitting, and funds only ever enter through the treasury and leave through a player pull. The full list and their roles are on the Technology page.

Status: in development. No contract is deployed to Robinhood Chain mainnet. Addresses will be published here and on the explorer when they are.

Ownership

Privileged roles behind a multisig.

Every privileged call (changing economic parameters within their published bounds, managing reward inventory, pausing) is gated by AccessController. The intended owner of those roles is a multisignature wallet with a time delay for parameter changes, so that no single key can act alone or act instantly.

Status: planned. Until the multisig is configured and published, assume administrative keys are held by the development team.

Pause mechanisms

Four switches, not one.

EmergencyPause exposes independent switches so that one concern can be frozen without freezing the rest. Pausing is always reversible and never moves funds.

  • DepositsNew deposits and chip minting stop. Existing chips, play and claims are unaffected.
  • GameplayNo new rounds open and no new wagers are accepted. In-flight rounds still settle; claims and withdrawals continue.
  • ClaimsRecording of new claimable balances pauses. Balances already recorded stay owed and can still be withdrawn.
  • WithdrawalsPulls from the treasury and reward vault pause. Nothing is moved or re-assigned; balances remain the player's.
Withdrawal protections

Pull, never push.

Winnings and withdrawals are recorded as balances owed to an address and are withdrawn by that address. The protocol never initiates a transfer to a player. This removes an entire class of reentrancy and griefing problems and means a paused withdrawal is a delay, not a loss: the balance remains recorded against you.

Before any wager is accepted the risk engine confirms the treasury can cover it in full, so a claimable balance is always backed by collateral that was reserved at the moment the bet was taken.

Audits

Not yet audited.

Not yet auditedNo third-party review of any contract has been completed or commissioned.

We will not describe the protocol as audited until an independent review has been completed and its report is linked from this page in full, including unresolved findings. Until then, treat the contracts as unreviewed software.

Responsible disclosure

Found something? Tell us first.

If you believe you have found a vulnerability, please report it privately and give us reasonable time to respond before publishing. We will acknowledge receipt, keep you informed and credit you if you wish.

security@[placeholder domain]address to be confirmed before launch

Please do not test against mainnet funds or other players. A testnet deployment and scope will be published alongside the contract addresses.

Limits of control

What admins can never do.

Regardless of who holds the privileged roles, the contracts are designed so that no administrator can:

  1. 01Alter the outcome of a completed round. Results are derived from a commitment published before bets opened.
  2. 02Rewrite history. Rounds, wagers and settlements are events on a public chain, not rows we control.
  3. 03Take player escrow. Chips staked in a round can only be released to the player or settled by the round's own result.
  4. 04Change a submitted wager. Once accepted, a wager's amount and position are fixed in the round record.
  5. 05Mint chips without a deposit, or burn a player's chips without a withdrawal from that player.
  6. 06Move a claimable balance to another address. Claims are pulled by the address that earned them.

Administrators can pause the switches above, adjust economic parameters inside their published bounds, and add or remove reward inventory. Those actions are visible onchain.